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ARTICLE
OBSCENE TELEPHONE CALLS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF
STATUTES
REED DICKERSON*
Members of the legal profession continually confront problems of statutory interpretation.Unfortunately, most lawyers have been inadequately
trainedto read and to draft statutes, resulting in poorly reasonedjudicial
decisions and policy choices.
In this Article, Professor Dickerson explores common problems associated with statutory interpretation.In exploring these problems, he describes the cognitive process involved in reading a statute and the large
fund of tacit assumptions that condition this process. Through a case
study analysis, he suggests a method of approachingproblems of statutory
interpretation.

This Article presents an exercise in statutory interpretation,
for the most part as it was presented several years ago to the
appellate judges of Florida at their annual educational meeting.I
The following hypothetical case, which is based on an actual
statute from another state 2 was submitted to more than twentyfive judges, each of whom was invited to complete an unfinished
opinion in advance of the meeting.

I. THE

UNFINISHED OPINION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS OF FLORIDA,
SECOND DISTRICT
SAMUEL POLITTE,
Appellant
No. 80-1690
:
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee
REED, Judge.
Defendant is a twenty-three year old interstate truck driver
who has a citizens band (C.B.) radio with an outside range of
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. A.B., Williams College, 1931; LL.B., Harvard University, 1934; LL.M., Columbia University, 1939;
J.S.D., Columbia University, 1950. Chairman of the Committee on Language Science
and Formal Systems, Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Association.
This paper was originally presented in extended form at the annual meeting of the
Semiotic Society of America at Snowbird, Utah, on October 8, 1983. In preparing it, I
was helped by comments from James B. Minor and Professors Harry Pratter and Michael
B.W. Sinclair.
IThe meeting was held at Innisbrook, Tarpon Springs, Florida, on June 18-20, 1981.
2 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-285 (West 1983).
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ten miles. At about 2:00 a.m. on January 20, 1980, while operating his radio in one of several frustrating attempts to locate
vulnerable female companionship to break his boredom on
Route 41 between Naples and Miami, defendant made radio
contact with a thirty-five year old unaccompanied woman who
had an immediate problem of her own.
A resident of Bonita Springs, complainant was driving to be
with her husband, who had been hospitalized while on a business trip to Miami Beach. Some miles past Ochopee, she realized that she was running low on gasoline and that, without a
map of the area, she had no idea as to where she might refuel.
Starting to panic over the possibility of being stranded alone on
a dark highway, she turned to her C.B. radio. The resulting
coincidence produced an interesting conversation. Irritated at
finding trouble rather than release, defendant offered a stream
of obscenity and profanity. Then, sensing that the situation
might not be all that bad, defendant tried a friendlier tone. He
offered to convoy complainant to the Paolita truck stop, where,
he said, there was lots of gas, good booze, and a nice place to
have sex. After some further agonizing, complainant reluctantly
agreed to being tailgated into Paolita. No names were exchanged. The conversation was overheard by the police and,
when the two vehicles arrived at Paolita, a squad car was
waiting.
Defendant was charged and convicted before the Circuit
Court, Collier County, of violating the following Florida statute:
"No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call,
conversation, or conference of an anonymous nature and therein
use obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent language, suggestions or proposals of an obscene nature and threats
of any kind whatsoever." Fla. Stat. § 899.999 (1984).
The applicable federal statute provides: "Whoever utters any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
The case is on appeal on the narrow question of whether, on
the facts just recited, the Florida statute was violated. In view
of Thigpen v. State, 350 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
cert. dismissed, 354 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1978), no question has been
raised about the constitutionality of the statute.
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APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Five judges responded with completed opinions that not only
raised valuable relevant considerations but, through a number
of significant omissions, also confirmed the previously expressed suspicion that American judges need to be further sensitized to problems of meaning. 3
At the meeting, the following principles for interpreting statutes were offered. But first there must be a word of caution.
In a search for guiding principles for interpreting statutes, it
is tempting to assume that the problem is to unravel a unitary
concept called "interpretation." What many lawyers do not realize is that what lawyers call "interpretation" includes, in the
case of statutes, more than what that term normally means
outside the law, which is finding whatever meaning there is in a
writing. 4
In litigation, unfortunately, finding whatever meaning there is
in the writing does not necessarily resolve the issue being litigated. Suppose a court, after exploring all the resources of
meaning, concludes that the statute is invincibly uncertain or
incomplete with respect to the case at hand. Unless the statute
is so defective as to be unconstitutionally vague or unfair, the
court is still faced with resolving the controversy. It must repair
the statute, and it can do this only by making new law. Unfortunately, the idea that a court could make law on its own, instead
of "discovering" it, was until recently so abhorrent that courts
have maintained surface respectability by calling their lawmaking with respect to statutes "interpretation." This Article, however, is concerned only with interpretation in its normal sense
of cognition.
Every successful, written communication consists of two factors: the written communication, which may consist of more
than one instrument, and its external context.5 No message is
complete without both. Interpretation, conversely, should be
limited to both.
The more difficult concept is external context.6 Figure 1 beSee R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 3,

10-

11(1975).
4 See id. at 13-21.
Id. at 103, 124.
6 See generally id. at 105-24 (materials describing the elements of external context).
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low, consisting of the well-known Necker cube, exemplifies
unresolvable ambiguity.8 The question is whether the cube is
being seen from above or from below.
Figure 1
Ambiguity

The ambiguity is immediately resolved when the same cube
appears in a persuasive context (Figure 2). In Context A, the
Figure 2
Ambiguity Resolved

Ambiguity Resolved

Context A

Context B

A-T--

__-p

7 Louis Albert Necker first observed perspective reversal, or two ways of seeing, in
line drawings of rhomboid crystals in 1832. The same phenomenon occurs in line
drawings of transparent cubes, best seen from the perspective exemplified by the figure
in the text. Hence, the term "Necker cube" was born. Attneave, Multistability in
Perception, Sci. AM., Dec. 1921, at 63, 67.
8 See generally R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 23-27

(1965) [hereinafter cited as R. DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS]; Dickerson, The Diseases
of Legislative Language, I HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 5, 6-9 (1964) (discussions of statutory

ambiguity).
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cube is inevitably seen from below. In Context B, it is inevitably
seen from above.
Although its usual role is simply to limit the sweep of otherwise overly general terms, context is sometimes strong enough
to override otherwise clear express language, as in the following
example: ". . . one (1), two (2), two (3), four (4) .

. . ."

In this

example, the numeral "3" overrides the word "two" that immediately precedes it.
It is remarkable that a concept as basic as external context
has received so little attention from any source. Although there
is widespread agreement that external context is a vital ingredient,9 only a handful of writers have undertaken to explain
what it consists of or how it works.' 0
Briefly, the external context of a statute is that part of the
total statutory message that is already in the minds of the legislative audience. For the most part, it appears in the form of
factual, tacit assumptions that are shared by the author and the
audience or, in special instances, that are available to the audience through sources, such as a dictionary, that are customarily consulted. This concept can be clarified by looking at
several diagrams.
Figure 3 represents the statutory provision being interpreted.

Figure 3

Provision

Figure 4 represents the same provision in the context of the
rest of the statute, the relevant parts of which provide the
statute's internal context. This goes well beyond the part of
micro-context called "syntax."

9 See, e.g., E. DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 149-63 (2d ed. 1983); see

also R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 103 n.2 (compilation of additional authorities that
discuss the role of context in communication).
10See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 105, 108-09, 111, 117.
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Figure 4
Statute

Provision

MM_

Figure 5 shows the same provision and the statute in the field
of relevant word habits and express or tacit assumptions that
constitute the external context of the provision and statute.

Figure 5

Figure 6 shows the same concepts in relation to information
or material that lies beyond the scope of external context.
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The critical question is, how does the reader know what
extrinsic material is part of external context and what lies beyond it? All the following questions must be answered affirmatively before extrinsic material can be considered part of external context:
(1) Is it relevant?
(2) Is it reliable and reliably revealed?
(3) Is it shared or readily shareable by the author with typical
members of the legislative audience?
(4) Do both author and typical members of that audience rely
on it to carry part of the message or to affect it?I'
Nonstatutory material that does not meet the standards of
context should not be considered, except for confirmatory purposes, while the court is determining what the statute, as en" R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 124.
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acted, means. Exclusion of such material is necessary to protect
the legislative audience against unfair surprise.
Knowing this, how does the reader find the meaning of a
statute? The first step is to explicate it.12 Here are Justice Frankfurter's three famous rules: "(1) Read the statute; (2) read the
statute; (3) read the statute!" 3 Unfortunately, most judges, lawyers, and law professors have been inadequately trained to read
statutes. Indeed, many are reluctant even to try.
Justice Frankfurter has also admonished the reader that in
interpreting statutes "[t]he aids of formal reasoning are not irrelevant; they may simply be inadequate." 4 The ascertainment
of meaning is not so much one of deductive logic as it is one of
reacting to a total situation, to which that reaction is psychological, immediate, and typical of the legislative audience and
results from recognizing established symbols and meanings.
Ascertaining the meaning of a statute is something like answering the question, "Is the picture before me one of Burt
Reynolds?" The primary method of cognition is the informed
"gut reaction," which is ultimately based on verbal habits. It is
one of recognition and perception. Either the reader recognizes
the symbols, or he does not. Either he perceives the aggregate
message, or he does not. This method falls within the pragmatic
dimension of semiotics, providing a fertile field for the
psycholinguists.
The main job of statutory interpretation, therefore, is not to
discover specific rules for unlocking meaning in specific cases,
but to try to react normally to a complex situation. This means
developing a wholesome, sympathetic attitude that is sensitive
to the appropriate total context.
Constitutionally valid cognition in the case of statutes'involves looking at the right materials with the right attitude. Here
are some specific recommendations for doing this:
(1) Look at all the relevant language of the statute.
(2) Look at it from the vantage point of a typical member of
the legislative audience. This vantage point is defined by
" Id. at 217-37.
H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967) (quoting a statement reportedly made by

Frankfurter).
'4

Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLLM. L. REV. 527,

529 (1947).
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what is generally understood about the meanings of words
in that speech community, which is the semantic dimension, and what is taken for granted in that speech community as conditioning this kind of provision, which is the
contextual dimension.
(3) Look at it with an attitude of unbiased inquiry, which is
a form of empathy. Individual predilections should be
saved for the creative phase.
(4) React!
(5) If this does not provide a persuasive answer, balance the
respective probabilities using the normal legislative assumptions and principles of deductive logic. This step is
roughly analogous to the mathematician's vector analysis.
This process should handle the resolvable doubts. The unresolvable ones, by hypothesis, can be handled only by an act of
judicial lawmaking,15 which this Article does not consider.
A large fund of tacit assumptions conditions the cognitive
process. These assumptions include many rebuttable assumptions of fact that, as part of external context, are based on
established tendencies. The force of these tacit assumptions in
a particular case must be determined in light of the peculiar
circumstances surrounding that case. For example, in a statute
it is generally assumed that the draftsman used his words in
their normal senses and that he meant what he said. The statistical force of this generally reliable assumption inheres in the
nature of language. It is further assumed that the draftsman did
not intend to contradict himself. This, too, is a strong assumption. Third, it is assumed that the statute is intended to produce
a constitutional result. This assumption is somewhat less reliable. Fourth, it is assumed that "the legislature was made up of
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."' 6
This assumption is highly tentative. Finally, it is assumed that
the draftsman did not include language unless it contributed to
the ideas expressed. This assumption is relatively weak.

Is

See generally R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 13-21 (ascertainment of meaning
distinguished from judicial lawmaking).
16H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (tent. ed. 1958).
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These assumptions coalesce into a broad and highly tentative
assumption that the draftsman followed sound drafting practices. The general strength of this assumption can be tested by
inspecting the statute being interpreted. This inspection will
disclose the degree of professionalism of the author and thus
the general extent to which it can be assumed that he complied
with the principles of good drafting.
Professor Elmer Driedger has crystallized these insights by
suggesting that, when interpreting a statute, it is useful to reverse the drafting process.' 7 This is a good idea, but to do it the
reader must know what legal drafting is and what good legal
drafting entails.
Legal drafting, like other sophisticated expository writing,
operates not only in the domain of language but also in the
domain of concepts. It is a two-level operation in which the two
levels interact: substantive concepts shape the author's language, and the disciplined use of language helps shape his
concepts.'1
If Professor Driedger is right, the surest way to find the meaning of a statute is to rewrite it. This forces the reader to read
deeply instead of merely reading what others, usually judges or
law professors, have said about it. As an educational exercise,
it heightens the lawyer's sensitivity to the trouble zones of
language and their matching concepts. Most importantly, systematic writing strategies can greatly improve the substance of
the author's message.' 9
In summary form, the main strategies of good drafting are
these:
(1) Be strictly consistent. Always state the same idea in the
same way. Always state different ideas differently. As far
as possible, arrange similar things similarly. 20
7

Driedger, A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 29 CAN. B. Rcv. 838, 843

(1951).
" See R. DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 10-13,46-47, 133; Dickerson,

Legal Drafting: Writing as Thinking, Or, Talk-Back from Your Draft and How to Exploit
It, 29 J. LEGAL EDUc. 373, 374-75 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson, Legal Drafting]; see also R. DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING, 99-106 (1981) (compilation of additional sources that discuss the two levels of legal drafting) [hereinafter
cited as R. DICKERSON, MATERIALS).
' See Dickerson, Legal Drafting, supra note 18, at 377.
20R. DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 11-12; Dickerson, Legal Drafting,
supra note 18, at 378-79; see also R. DICKERSON, MATERIALS, supra note 18, at 16874 (compilation of additional sources that discuss the importance of consistency).
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(2) Arrange so as to clarify structure. As far as possible,
arrange ideas hierarchically, and juxtapose the ideas that
share the strongest affinities.21
(3) Follow established usage. 22 As far as possible, conform to
the established usages of the speech communities to which
the statute is addressed. In other words, avoid "Humpty-

Dumptyism." 2 3
These strategies and the principles already discussed can be
used to explicate and improve the state statute that governs the
Politte case. That statute provides:
I
2
3
4
5

No person shall engage in or institute a local telephone call,
conversation or conference of an anonymous nature and therein
use obscene, profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent language,
suggestions or proposals of an obscene nature and threats
of any kind whatsoever.

Literally, line 1 says that no person is required to "engage
in." This form of statement is grammatically undesirable, because negating a requirement does not necessarily negate a
power or privilege to act, which it is necessary to do in order
to imply the prohibition that context clearly calls for here. Literal meaning and context should support each other, not conflict
with each other. The statute should read, "No person may . . ."
or preferably "A person may [or 'shall'] not . . ." or "A person

who .... "
The inclusion of both "engage in" and "institute" is redundant
in this context. How can a person institute a telephone call in
which he uses obscene language without "engaging" in the call?
The words "or institute" should be omitted.
Lines 1 and 2 pose a potential syntactic ambiguity. Does
"telephone" modify only "call" or does it also modify "conver21 R. DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 12, 55-72; Dickerson, Legal
Drafting, supra note 18, at 377-78.
" R. DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 12-13, 103-04; Dickerson, Legal
Drafting, supra note 18, at 379.
3 R. DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 13, 103-04; Dickerson, Legal
Drafting, supra note 18, at 379. The term "Humpty-Dumptyism" stems from Lewis
Carroll's tale, in which Humpty-Dumpty tells Alice that a word means whatever he
chooses it to mean. L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 163 (Gray ed. 1971).
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sation" and "conference"? Grammatically, if it modifies "conversation," it must also modify "conference." A similar question
arises for the term "local." Stated in tabular form, the grammatical alternatives are these:
(1) No:
(a) local telephone call;
(b) conversation; or
(c) conference.
(2) No
(a)
(b)
(c)

local:
telephone call;
conversation; or
conference.

(3) No
(a)
(b)
(c)

local telephone:
call;
conversation; or
conference.

Syntax fortified by total context suggests that alternative C is
what the legislature intended. The syntax is supplied by the
concluding modifier, "of an anonymous nature," which necessarily modifies "conference" and must also modify "conversation" and "call," because it would make no sense to apply the
anonymity requirement to only one of three obviously overlapping concepts. Also, it would be hard to have an anonymous
conversation or conference unless it were conducted by
telephone.
The next question is whether all three terms are needed. The
word "conference" may be dropped as included in the broader
word "conversation." The word "conversation" may then be
dropped as included in the broader word "call." The latter term
is needed because the legislature probably intended to include
the situation where a caller merely utters a stream of obscenities
and hangs up, thus precluding "conversation." There are also
semantic problems, which will be discussed later.
In line 3, the question arises whether some of the modifiers
may be dropped as covered by others. "Lewd" and "lascivious"
may be dropped as included in the sex oriented "obscene."
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"Vulgar" may be dropped as unconstitutionally vague. 24 Although "obscene" is included in "indecent," the former is
needed because it targets one of the two basic evils to which
the statute seems to be directed-obscenities and threats. The
term "indecent" is presumably needed to cover other, though
less significant, forms of indecency.
The most difficult problem of meaning appears in lines 3 and
4, where the syntax does not make immediately clear whether
the primary series consists of two main elements, the first of
which is a subseries of three, or of three main elements. In other
words, are the phrases within the statute properly grouped as:
(1) obscene or profane language, suggestions, or proposals;
and
(2) threats;
or as:
(1) obscene or profane language;
(2) obscene suggestions or proposals; and
(3) threats?
The tip-off is "suggestions," which demands a modifier. The
most logical modifier is "of an obscene nature." If in addition
to modifying "proposals" it modifies "suggestions," it must also
modify "language," assuming that the latter is part of the subseries of three under the first alternative reading. But if this is
so, it collides with "obscene" and its fellow modifiers in line 3.
Conversely, if the modifiers that precede "language" also modify
"suggestion," they must also modify "proposals" and thus collide with "of an obscene nature."
If the reader accepts the second alternative reading, reinforced with penultimate commas after "lascivious" in line 3 and
"nature" in line 4 but not after "suggestions," and if the reader
recognizes that "suggestions" includes "proposals," the various
pieces fall into place.
The final problem involves "and" in line 4. Semantically, the
word is crystal clear. It means conjunction, not disjunction, and
4 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[ilt is largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.").
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nothing in the syntax suggests otherwise. External context, on
the other hand, indicates that the legislature could hardly have
meant what it expressly said. It is generally accepted that anonymous harassment by telephone, whether by obscene or profane
language, obscene proposals, or threats is a social evil that a
legislature may properly try to curtail. But it strains credulity
to assume that the legislature did not intend to punish an obscene telephone call unless it also contained both a threat and
dirty words. Here, clear context prevails over otherwise clear
words. As the last touch up of this provision, therefore, "and"
should be changed to "or" in line 4.
In more modern legal language, we finally get something like
this:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

A person who, in a local telephone call and without revealing
his identity:
(1) uses obscene, otherwise indecent, or profane
language;
(2) makes an obscene suggestion; or
(3) makes a threat of any kind;
commits a class C felony and shall be punished as provided in
section 775.908.

Clauses (1) and (2) make good substantive sense because the
concept of offensive language may appropriately have a broader
sweep than that of offensive suggestions.
Along the way, meanings have been assumed based only on
probabilities. Although the conclusions are thus only best
guesses, this is an unavoidable risk that further checking can
usually reduce.
This drafting exercise is also helpful in the much more sophisticated task of applying the statute to the Politte case. That
case also presents the semantic problems of whether "local
telephone call" includes use of a C.B. radio and whether Politte's call was "anonymous." Finally, the corresponding federal
statute raises the ultimate contextual problem of negative

implication. 25
The following opinion, to be added to Judge Reed's statement
2 See generally R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 41-42; R. DICKERSON, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 26-28 (discussions of the concept of negative implication).
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of facts set forth at the beginning, is designed to suggest what
might go into an ideal judicial exercise in statutory interpretation. It is ideal only in its attempt to exhaust the aspects of
meaning that are worth exploring during the law finding phase
of the judge's mission. So limited, it does not necessarily rule
out later resort to extrinsic materials, such as legislative history.
It implies only that noncontextual materials should not be consulted unless the law finding phase has been completed without
satisfactorily disclosing the meaning of the statute. 26 Drawing
the line here is not easy, because the two phases shade imperceptibly into each other. One unrealistic aspect of this opinion,
which was distributed at the end of the meeting and suggested
only as a goal to strive for, is that it benefited from time and
other resources that are normally unavailable to most judges.
The opinion is also unrealistic in that the semantic and syntactic
discussion is overly detailed for the published draft.
Although none of the responding judges voted for affirmance,
perhaps correctly, their reasons for reversal, all of which are
discussed in the following opinion, were not conclusive. As is
often the case, what is ultimately involved here is good faith
judgment. The real challenge is to see the relevant legal and
factual issues.
III.

THE OPINION COMPLETED

OPINION BY JUDGE REED (continued):

Defendant makes several points in urging that the conviction
below be reversed.
His first point is that his use of a C.B. radio did not constitute
a "local telephone call," because a C.B. radio is not a "telephone," as required by the statute.
This argument assumes several things. It first assumes that
"telephone" modifies not only "call," but "conversation" and
"conference." This is one grammatical possibility, but not necessarily the only one. It is arguable that, instead, it modifies
only "call," in which case defendant's actions fall easily into
26 See R. DICKERSON, supra note 3, at 137-97; Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:
Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983).
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the category of the unmodified "conversation," if not "conference." On the other hand, it is hard to envision a conversation
or conference other than a telephonic one that could create the
kind of problem to which the statute is directed.
If it is assumed, more plausibly, that "telephone" modifies all
three terms, the question arises as to why the last two were
used, since both are included in the first. The answer seems to
be that the draftsman, following a now indefensible legal tradition, was overgenerous with his words.
Defendant's argument also seems to assume that "telephone"
includes only its most common exemplification, the conventional commercial telephone. The underlying fallacy here is the
assumption that because something is a radio it is precluded
from also being a telephone. The New EncyclopediaBritannica,
for example, tells us that the word "telephone" is assigned to
an "apparatus for producing articulate speech and other sounds
at a distance through the medium of electric waves." 18 The
New Encyclopwdia Britannica 82 (15th ed. 1975).
Radio is a common part of even conventional telephone service, since many segments operate without wires. Even where
radio is the main instrument of sending voice messages, it is
often referred to as "radiotelephone." Semantically and functionally, a radiotelephone is an established form of "telephone."
That C.B. radios are not ordinarily called "telephones" no more
challenges the aptness of that designation than the almost universal use of "aspirin" challenges the aptness of "acetylsalicylic
acid." There is nothing in the text, or in its broadest context,
to make it plausible that the legislature intended to connote an
omission or exception based on the absence of wires at any
point, on the fact that popular usage has conferred an alternative
name on this kind of telephone, or on the fact that the instrument
was private rather than commercial or quasi-public.
Defendant reinforces his point by arguing that the limitation
to "local" calls assumes the traditional dichotomy between "local" and "long distance," a dichotomy foreign to radiotelephones
operating outside the established commercial systems, thus implying their exclusion from the statute. Defendant points out,
correctly, that the meaning of a composite term, such as "local
telephone call," cannot safely be identified with the sum of the
meanings of its respective parts, which in this case would include "any telephone call that is local." Having pointed out that
"root beer" is not beer and that the "parol evidence rule" is not
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a rule of evidence, defendant contends that "local telephone
call," having been used so long to distinguish it from "long
distance telephone call" has acquired a composite meaning that
is narrower than, if not different from, the broad generic sweep
of its constituent language.
Defendant's examples, unfortunately, are inapt, because the
established meanings of those composite terms are inconsistent
with and therefore exclude a literal reading of the aggregate or
the parts. In the present case, there is no inconsistency in
expressly referring to what is inherently local in a C.B. radio
call as a "local call." At worst, there is harmless surplusage
resulting from making one expression do the work of two.
Defendant contends that if the legislature had intended to
cover C.B. radios, it could easily have referred to them in the
statute. This is, of course, true. Silence in such a case, however,
is a weak reed on which to hang a negative implication. It is
more likely that the legislature intended to use language broad
enough to encompass not only C.B. radios but also any other
form of telephone. Specifically mentioning C.B. radios without
mentioning other telephonic devices could have set up an unintended negative implication.
Indeed, defendant also argues that in spite of these considerations, it is unlikely that the legislature at any point had C.B.
radios in mind. Although this may be readily conceded, it is
irrelevant. It would show a serious ignorance of the legislative
process to assume that a statute is intended to cover only what
the legislature specifically adverted to during the process of
enactment. The specifics that move it to action rarely, if ever,
encompass the full dimensions of the problem to which the
statute is addressed. Statutes are normally intended to control
the future, which the legislature can only see in general terms,
with the result that it normally intends to cover by such terms
aspects of the overall problem that it did not, and even could
not, specifically anticipate. The term "electronic devices," for
example, readily accommodates electric devices, falling within
the general description, that at the time of its enactment in a
statute had not yet been invented and could not even have been
foreseen.
Rather, with their inherently limited range, C.B. radios fall
comfortably within the generic concept of immediacy that helps
define the reach of the statute. Certainly, nothing suggests that
the legislature had any purpose that would be served by not
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giving "local call" its full semantic sweep, however superfluous
"local" might be for C.B. radios.
The overriding consideration is the general presumption that
a legislature in striking at a disclosed evil intends to strike at all
of it. Why would the legislature want to exclude an abuse that
differs from the abuses plainly within the statute only in irrelevant technological details? There is nothing to make the abuse
de minimis or its prohibition administratively less enforceable.
Nor is the generic meaning unconstitutionally vague in its application to C.B. radios, which are inherently local.
Lingering doubts force us to face defendant's contention that
he is entitled to the benefit of the time-honored principle that
ambiguous or otherwise uncertain criminal statutes should be
construed "strictly." Against this contention, the State argues
that in this context the term "strict" has no fixed or established
meaning and that the best way to resolve the consequent uncertainty is to examine the objectives behind the so-called rule.
It further argues that the most plausible objective of the principle
is to induce the legislature to give the potential criminal fair
warning of the kind of action that the state is proscribing. See
R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes
205-11 (1975). This concept fits comfortably with constitutional
due process. Indeed, it inheres in it.
It is our opinion that the obscenity statute adequately warned
the defendant, and thus complies with the implied constitutional
requirement. That resort to a C.B. radio did not relieve defendant from criminal stigma should not surprise him, especially
when there was a confirmatory warning of impropriety in the
federal obscenity statute applicable to "radio communication."
See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
It is of no consequence that such a defendant is likely never
to have examined either statute. The requirement of fair warning
is fully satisfied if the statute and its context, which assumes
knowledge of the normal meanings of words and the access to
generally shared assumptions, gave the defendant a decent opportunity to know the legal hazards. And if a defendant has
chosen to tread closely to the margins of vague criminal words,
he cannnot necessarily complain if a court happens to draw the
outer boundaries of illegality more broadly than he would have
done, especially "where the function of notice and hearing is
assisted by common knowledge and understanding of conventional values as in the case of offenses which are malum in se."
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3 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 59.03, at 8
(4th ed. 1974). "[T]here is usually a twilight zone between honest
conduct and crime, in which the defendant should move at his
peril .

. . ."

Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Stat-

utes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 761 n.66 (1935).
Defendant also contends that because the parties arranged to
meet and did in fact meet, the statutory requirement of anonymity was defeated. This assertion seems inconsistent with the
thrust of the statute, because anonymity is normally determined
as of the time of the offending act, not on the basis of what
happens later. To conclude otherwise would defeat criminality
in every instance in which the call succeeded in luring a weaker
party into a sexual liaison.
The defendant makes the additional point that, however obscene or profane his conduct may have been, he had not met
the requirements of the statute because it also requires a threat.
Semantically, the observation seems sound. On the other hand,
it would be the grossest literalism not to recognize the force of
total context. This is especially true in a statute that gives
evidence of having been carelessly crafted. The significant context in this instance is the obvious immediate purpose of the
statute.
It would be highly unlikely that a legislature so clearly opposed to obscene telephone calls would be willing to suffer them
if they were unaccompanied by a threat. Conversely, is a serious
threat any less serious if it is unaccompanied by obscene or
profane language? The same problem arises for obscene suggestions unaccompanied by obscene or profane language. The
notion that the statute so conjoins three independent kinds of
reprehensible action is so absurd as to make a literal reading
highly implausible. Even if the literal meaning had been intended, defendant's conduct in this case might well have implied
a threat to abandon the complainant if she did not comply.
Defendant's final contention is that any attempt to apply this
statute to C.B. radios would thwart federal supremacy, because
the federal obscenity statute applicable to radio communication
preempts the field by negative implication, thus precluding state
legislative action in that area. He cites People v. Vogler, 90
Misc. 2d 709, 395 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1977), and Phillips v. General
Finance Corp., 297 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1974).
Vogler is hardly impressive authority because it is a New
York town court's interpretation of a federal statute. Moreover,
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its rationale misstates the accepted concept of statutory preemption, which is a form of negative implication. In that case, the
court stated that "[t]he establishment of a regulatory commission ... plus Federal licensing and enforcement of violations
. .. are evidence of a Congressional intent to pre-empt the

sphere of radio broadcasting." Vogler, 90 Misc. 2d at 713, 395
N.Y.S.2d at 884. But it is simply not true that federal occupation
of an area of law is by itself sufficient to exclude state legislation
in the same area. It is not even evidence of an intent to do so.
It is obvious that no state by its own legislative action can
nullify otherwise valid federal legislation. A problem of preemption arises only where express federal action relates to part, but
not all, of an area and is silent with respect to the rest. The
question may then arise whether federal silence in the residual
area means "hands off" to the states by reason of a negative
implication or has left the area open to supplementary action by
the states. Such questions can be resolved only by total context,
not mere federal silence.
In any event, the issue is hardly foreclosed by the views of a
minor state court, especially when they are contradicted by
those of a court of our own state, which, in Phillips, 297 So. 2d
at 6, declared that preemption depends on whether state action
frustrates federal action. This statement, unfortunately, fails to
indicate whether the state statute must frustrate an express
provision of the federal statute or need frustrate only a negative
implication from it. If the former, the statement misstates the
preemption principle. If the latter, the frustration test cannot be
applied until it is determined whether the circumstances surrounding the express federal provisions create a general implication that the federal action was intended to be exclusive. If
the federal provisions do create such an implication, the reader
need go no further, because any state statute in the area would
automatically frustrate the negative implication. The Phillips
statement fails in either event.
There being no indication in the federal statute or its context
that Congress intended to exclude supplemental state action or
that the particular state action otherwise undermined that statute, defendant's contention has no merit.
Judgment affirmed.

